I am working on a new account of what psychosis is. Philosophers would call it an ontology: a claim about what kind of thing psychosis is, as distinct from what causes it. My reason is that the models I know best describe psychosis with great care, and each of them leaves out what I have come to see as central: the ego, the part of every mind that claims experience as “I” and “mine”.
The most influential philosophical model treats schizophrenia as a disturbance of the minimal self, the tacit sense that experience is one’s own. The person becomes acutely aware of what should stay in the background and loses the ordinary feeling of being the source of their own thoughts and actions (Sass & Parnas, 2003). More recently, Sass and his colleagues have argued that something is also heightened, since many patients describe a sense of being at the centre of all reality (Feyaerts & Sass, 2024, p. 464; Sass & Feyaerts, 2024). Their critics reply that such reports concern what is experienced and do not show a heightened structure of the self (Raballo et al., 2025, p. 1189). Humpston (2018, p. 215) states the puzzle clearly: the patient can be barely aware of their own selfhood and at the same time the centre of the world.
A second body of work asks how psychosis differs from mystical or contemplative experience. Brett (2002a, p. 335) argues that in psychosis the structure of the ego is kept, in a distorted form, while in mysticism it is let go. Parnas and Henriksen (2016b, p. 78) locate the difference in volition: the mystic seeks and partly controls the experience, and the person with schizophrenia suffers it. In practice these lines blur. The same experiences can be told as illness or as revelation depending on who is listening (Kusters, 2020, p. 168), and one Zen practitioner, manic at the time, could not say whether the experience was illness or awakening (Lindahl & Britton, 2019, p. 170).
Each of these accounts asks what has happened to the self, or how psychosis differs from mystical experience. None of them asks what the person is holding onto. That is the question my own practice keeps putting in front of me, because on the ward I see a great deal of psychosis that looks like difficulty in seeing beyond the I-maker’s immediate narrative.
By ego I do not mean vanity or self-importance, and I do not use the word as a criticism. Everyone has an ego. In Vedānta it is one of the ordinary functions of the mind, alongside thinking, judging and remembering, and no one could act, speak or care for themselves without it. Its Sanskrit name is ahaṃkāra, literally the “I-maker”: the function that produces the sense of being a separate “I”. Śaṅkara describes its work as abhimāna, the taking of things as “I” and “mine”, which later Advaita analyses into two assertions, “I am this” and “this is mine” (Ram-Prasad, 2011, p. 229). On this view the “I” is one more object, constructed and then mistaken for the one who sees. It is also transparent to the person in whom it operates: someone who feels sad does not notice that the sadness has been claimed by a sense of “mine” that is itself constructed (Ram-Prasad, 2011, p. 231). The problem, then, is not that a person has an ego. It is that this claiming goes unnoticed, so that the egoic self it builds is taken for the whole of who they are.
Holding on in this way is not a moral failing. Humpston (2018, p. 226) argues that the solipsistic position in schizophrenia is taken up not by choice but to hold a threatened self together, and I think that is right. Nor am I proposing a single cause. The claim is narrower: this holding on is part of what psychosis is, and the current models have no place for it.
The contemplative traditions have recognised this for a long time. Brett (2002a, p. 334) cites the eleventh-century mystic Qushayri, who judged the expansion of the self to be the greatest danger on the path, one that leads to grandiosity and solipsistic delusions. Jung (1966, para. 227) called the same movement inflation: the appropriation of qualities that lie beyond the limits of the individual. He also saw that a person who believes they have let go can take on the power of what they released, and come to think of themselves as a hero, a magician or a saint (paras. 377–378). Engler (1984, p. 31), a psychologist and meditation teacher, put the developmental point directly: “you have to be somebody before you can be nobody.”
The picture I keep returning to comes from the teaching of Ram Dass, for whom spiritual life is a matter of becoming nobody. In psychosis, as I see it, a person goes through the door into a wider or stranger experience of self and world, but takes the egoic self through with them. The expansion is real, but the “I” claims it as its own. That would explain why the debate over self-presence finds evidence on both sides. The person is diminished, because ordinary selfhood has given way, and heightened, because what remains has claimed the whole of experience for itself.
An account built on this would ask a different first question of a person in psychosis. It would ask what has happened to their sense of self, and also what they are holding onto and what letting go of it would mean. Developing that account, and testing it against the clinical and philosophical literature, is part of my current academic work.
References
Brett, C. (2002a). Psychotic and mystical states of being: Connections and distinctions. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 9(4), 321–341.
Engler, J. (1984). Therapeutic aims in psychotherapy and meditation: Developmental stages in the representation of self. Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 16(1), 25–61.
Feyaerts, J., & Sass, L. (2024). Self-disorder in schizophrenia: A revised view (1. Comprehensive review: Dualities of self- and world-experience). Schizophrenia Bulletin, 50(2), 460–471.
Humpston, C. S. (2018). The paradoxical self: Awareness, solipsism and first-rank symptoms in schizophrenia. Philosophical Psychology, 31(2), 210–231.
Jung, C. G. (1966). Two essays on analytical psychology (2nd ed., R. F. C. Hull, Trans.; Collected Works, Vol. 7). Princeton University Press. (Original works published 1943 and 1928)
Kusters, W. (2020). A philosophy of madness: The experience of psychotic thinking (N. Forest-Flier, Trans.). MIT Press. (Original work published 2014)
Lindahl, J. R., & Britton, W. B. (2019). ‘I have this feeling of not really being here’: Buddhist meditation and changes in sense of self. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 26(7–8), 157–183.
Parnas, J., & Henriksen, M. G. (2016b). Mysticism and schizophrenia: A phenomenological exploration of the structure of consciousness in the schizophrenia spectrum disorders. Consciousness and Cognition, 43, 75–88.
Raballo, A., Henriksen, M. G., Poletti, M., & Parnas, J. (2025). “Schizophrenia, consciousness, and the self” twenty years later: Revisiting the ipseity-disturbance model and the developmental nature of self-disorder in the schizophrenia spectrum. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 51(5), 1187–1192.
Ram-Prasad, C. (2011). Situating the elusive self of Advaita Vedānta. In M. Siderits, E. Thompson, & D. Zahavi (Eds.), Self, no self? Perspectives from analytical, phenomenological, and Indian traditions (pp. 217–238). Oxford University Press.
Sass, L., & Feyaerts, J. (2024). Self-disorder in schizophrenia: A revised view (2. Theoretical revision: Hyperreflexivity). Schizophrenia Bulletin, 50(2), 472–483.
Sass, L. A., & Parnas, J. (2003). Schizophrenia, consciousness, and the self. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 29(3), 427–444.
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